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ABSTRACT 
 It served as an axiom of Maryland’s constitutional history that settlers carried with them the 
“rights of Englishmen” when they crossed the Atlantic. In 1642 the Assembly of Maryland 
Freemen declared Maryland’s provincial judges were to follows the law of England. Maryland’s 
1776 Declaration of Independence left a legal lacuna--- what were to be the laws and public 
institutions of this newly created sovereign entity?  This paper considers the manner in which the 
sovereign state of Maryland filled the void. 
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ADOPTION OF ENGLISH LAW IN MARYLAND   
I. THE PROPRIETORSHIP 
     In 1632 King Charles I of England granted Cecil Calvert, the Second Lord Baltimore, a 
charter making him the first Lord Proprietor of Maryland with all the feudal privileges of a 
monarch over a New World colony.1  The Proprietorship allowed Lord Baltimore and his heirs to 
grant the lands of Maryland to any person willing to purchase.2  Calvert promoted settlement by 
offering “adventurers” land patents of “hundreds” in return for the transportation of themselves 
and their laborers who undertook “plantation.”3 
     The Barons of Baltimore, however, were vested with seigniory.  The 1632 Charter bestowed 
upon their hereditary line sovereign powers of the highest order.  They were authorized “for the 
good and happy Government of the said Province, . . . to . . . Enact Laws . . . with the Advise, 
Assent, and Approbation of the Free-Men of the same Province . . . .”4 
     It served as an axiom of our constitutional history that these settlers carried with them the 
“rights of Englishmen” when they crossed the Atlantic.5  And Maryland’s Charter guaranteed the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY 53, 63 
(photo. reprint 1967) (1879).   
2 See Maryland Charter of 1632, para. XVIII, translated in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1677, 1684-85 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].  The original charter was in Latin, and a copy of an early, printed English 
version, available at http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/educ/exhibits/founding/pdf/charter.pdf, may be accessed through 
the Archives of Maryland Online, but this version is paginated rather than organized by paragraphs.    
3 See CLARENCE P. GOULD, THE LAND SYSTEM IN MARYLAND 1720-1765, at 9-10 (1913).  By 1683, however, 
“transportation of settlers ceased to be the basis for the granting of lands, which were thereafter obtainable only on 
the payment of a purchase price . . . .”  Id. at 9.  See also JOHN KILTY, THE LAND-HOLDER’S ASSISTANT, AND LAND-
OFFICE GUIDE 29-64 (Baltimore, G. Dobbin & Murphy 1808).  The text of this book, available at 
http://aomol.net/000001/000073/html/index.html, may also be accessed through the Archives of Maryland Online.    
4 Maryland Charter of 1632, para. VII, translated in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1677, 
1679. 
5 Bernard C. Steiner, Adoption of English Law in Maryland, 8 YALE L.J. 353, 353 (1899). 
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colonists the right to preserve their citizenship and to possess “all Privileges, Franchises and 
Liberties of this our Kingdom of England . . . .”6 
     At its 1642 session, in An Act for Rule of Judicature, the Assembly of Maryland Freemen 
stated the role of Maryland’s provincial judges as follows: 
Right & just in all civill Causes shall be determined according to the law 
or most Generall usage of the province . . . .  And in defect of such Law 
usage or president then right & just shall be determined according to 
equity & good concience, not neglecting (so far as the Judge or Judges 
shall be informed thereof & shall find no inconvenience in the 
applycation to this province) the rules by which right & just useth & 
ought to be determined in England in the same or the like cases  And all 
crimes and offences shall be judged & determined according to the law 
of the Province or in defect of certain Law then they may be determined 
according to the best discretion of the Judge or Judges judging as neer as 
Conveniently may be to the laudable law or usage of England in the 
same or the like offenses  Provided that no person be adjudged of life 
member or freehold without Law certain of the Province7 
 
England was yet a powerful influence in the young, colonial world of Maryland. 
 
II. INDEPENDENCE 
     A century later, on July 3, 1776, the Maryland Convention in Annapolis adopted a resolution 
of independence.8  The next day in Philadelphia Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Samuel Chase, 
Thomas Stone, and William Paca signed the Declaration of Independence on the new state’s 
behalf.9  Independence left a legal lacuna—what were to be the laws and public institutions of 
                                                 
6 Maryland Charter of 1632, para. X, translated in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1677, 
1681. 
7 An Act for Rule of Judicature (1642), reprinted in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 147, 147-48 (William Hand Browne ed., Baltimore, Md. Historical Soc’y 
1883).  The text of this book, available at 
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000001/html/, may also be accessed through the 
Archives of Maryland Online.    
8 ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980, at 119-20, 802 (1988). 
9 Id. at 802. 
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this newly created sovereign entity?  The Maryland Convention filled the void when on August 
14, 1776 it adopted a Declaration of Rights.10  Article 3 of that Declaration read as follows: 
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of 
England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to 
the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their 
first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to 
their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since 
made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used, and 
practised by the courts of law or equity; . . . and the inhabitants of 
Maryland are also entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under 
the Charter, granted by his Majesty Charles I. to Caecilius Calvert, Baron 
of Baltimore.11 
 
     This Article 3 adopted three of England’s bodies of law for the independent state of 
Maryland: the common law as previously decided by judges; the statutes as previously enacted 
by Parliament; and the institution of property as derived from the feudal tradition.  This paper 
will dissect these bodies, one at a time. 
A. The Common Law of England  
     The Declaration of Rights refers to the mass of common law as it existed in England on July 
4, 1776 and makes it the law of Maryland as it remains yet today, except to the extent it has been 
changed or modified.12  It remained incumbent on the Maryland courts to decide whether the 
English common law should be made applicable under the circumstances,13 and once it was 
incorporated it was subject to change either by Maryland legislative act or judicial decision.14  
                                                 
10 See 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1686 n.a. 
11 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. III, reprinted in id. at 1686, 1686-87.  For a brief history and 
overview of Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights, see H. H. WALKER LEWIS, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION 
1776, at 45-52 (1976) (prepared for the Special Committee on the Bicentennial of the Maryland State Bar 
Association). 
12 See, e.g., Evans v. State, 886 A.2d 562, 574 (Md. 2005); Shaw v. Glickman, 415 A.2d 625, 631 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1980), cert. denied, 288 Md. 742 (1980); Jackson v. Jackson, 292 A.2d 145, 145 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) 
(citations omitted). 
13 See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821) (upholding an indictment for common law conspiracy 
where no Maryland statute defining the particular offense existed). 
14 See, e.g., Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (Md. 1979) (“[T]he common law is subject to change.  This is 
clearly apparent from its derivation and its very nature . . . .  It may be changed by legislative act . . . .  It may also be 
changed by judicial decision.” (citations omitted)). 
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     The Maryland fate of the English laws of intestacy provides a case in point.  Primogeniture—
brought to England by the Normans sometime after the conquest in 1066—prescribed the 
common law right to descent of land.15  It ordained that in the absence of a will the eldest son 
would inherit the whole of his father’s landed estate, to the exclusion of other siblings.16  
Primogeniture principles applied in the Maryland colony and in 1776 became the law of the state 
of Maryland under Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights.17  But in 1786 that law would change.  
That year the Maryland General Assembly passed An Act to Direct Descents, which declared 
that “the law of de[s]cents, which originated with the feudal [s]y[s]tem and military tenures, is 
contrary to ju[s]tice, and ought to be aboli[s]hed . . . .”18  It substituted rules of intestate 
succession, which divided the landed estate among all of the decedent’s living children.19 
     Under a legal system based upon stare decisis, this adoption by the Maryland courts of pre-
existing common law is unremarkable.  And over the course of the ensuing two centuries, old 
English precedents have been found applicable by Maryland courts in a variety of cases.  
Illustrations abound: In the early nineteenth century the Court of Appeals determined that a 
testator’s bequest to “‘the poor children belonging to the congregation of Saint Peter’s 
Protestant Episcopal Church’” failed according to the old English common law prohibition on 
indefinite charitable gifts.20  In the early twentieth century the Court of Appeals found women at 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., HUGH M. THOMAS, THE NORMAN CONQUEST: ENGLAND AFTER WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR 101 (2007). 
16 See Maryland State Archives Reference and Research, Understanding Maryland Records: Inheritance of Property, 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/refserv/html/inherit.html (last visited July 16, 2008) [hereinafter Inheritance of 
Property]. 
17 See MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. III, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 2, at 1686, 1686-87 (adopting principles of English law). 
18 An Act to Direct Descents, ch. XLV, pmbl. (1786), reprinted in 204 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: LAWS OF 
MARYLAND, 1785-1791, at 184, 184 (2000).  The text of this book, available at 
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000204/html/index.html, may also be accessed 
through the Archives of Maryland Online.  See also Inheritance of Property, supra note 16. 
19 See Inheritance of Property, supra note 16.  
20 Dashiell v. Attorney Gen., 5 H. & J. 392, 398-99 (Md. 1822).  
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a common law disability, which precluded them from taking official part in state government.21  
And late in the twentieth century the Court of Special Appeals held courts of equity had the 
power to compel debtors to post bond so as to discourage them from absconding from their 
creditors by virtue of an ancient common law writ.22  
     Pre-1776 common law continues to be recognized as applicable in the twenty-first century.  
For example, in Mason v. Board of Education,23 when the plaintiff filed suit on her twenty-first 
birthday to recover for negligence allegedly inflicted on her while she was a minor, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held she was one day too late under the three-year statute of limitations.24  
Since under the old English common law the plaintiff’s disability was removed one day prior to 
the anniversary of her birth, the statute of limitations had begun running the day before her 
eighteenth birthday.25 
     The English common law crimes (murder, burglary, larceny, and perjury, etc.) were also 
made part of Maryland law by the 1776 Declaration of Rights.26  Likewise included within the 
ambit of this incorporation were rules as to accessoryship27 and the “notion that an attempt to 
commit a crime [was] itself a crime . . . .”28   
                                                 
21 In re Maddox, 50 A. 487, 488 (Md. 1901) (denying a female law graduate admission to the Maryland bar).  
22 See Jackson v. Jackson, 292 A.2d 145, 147-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (upholding common law writ of ne 
exeat but quashing it upon the facts because it “cannot issue until after a court has passed a decree awarding alimony 
or support and there has been a default thereunder”). 
23 826 A.2d 433 (Md. 2003). 
24 See id. at 434, 438. 
25 See id. at 435.  
26 See Gladden v. State, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (Md. 1974) (murder); State v. Levitt, 426 A.2d 383, 388-89 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1981) (perjury); Sizemore v. State, 272 A.2d 824, 824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (burglary), cert. 
denied, 261 Md. 728 (1971); Gazaille v. State, 235 A.2d 306, 307 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (larceny). 
27 State v. Ward, 396 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Md. 1978), overruled in part by Lewis v. State, 404 A.2d 1073, 1077-79 
(Md. 1979) (upholding Ward modification to common law allowing the trial of an accessory before the sentencing 
of a principal but “because the principal . . . had not been sentenced [in Ward] . . . . such modification should in our 
judgment be given only prospective effect”). 
28 Gray v. State, 403 A.2d 853, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
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     Today this embrace of the common law of crimes and punishments may prove to be 
constitutionally problematic.  In Rogers v. Tennessee,29 the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included “core due 
process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those 
concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been 
innocent conduct.”30  Will the prosecution of obscure and largely forgotten common law crimes 
run afoul of “criminal due process”? 
     The nineteenth century case of State v. Buchanan31 illustrates the problem.  A criminal 
prosecution was brought against a group of Baltimore bankers who had held the controlling 
interest in the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States.32  The defendants had lent 
themselves the bank’s money without paying interest and without providing any security.33  
When the bank failed and they were unable to repay the loans, they were criminally prosecuted 
for a “conspiracy.”34  Since Maryland had not yet enacted an embezzlement statute the bankers 
defended themselves on the grounds that the indictment specified no underlying crime that they 
had conspired to commit.35  Insider trading and self-dealing might amount to a breach of trust, 
but they were not common law crimes, they argued.  
     The trial court discharged the defendants, but on appeal by the state the Maryland Court of 
Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.  The appeals court considered the allegations of the 
indictment as establishing a punishable conspiracy at common law—a conspiracy “wrongfully to 
                                                 
29 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
30 Id. at 459 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351-52, 354-55 (1964)). 
31 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821). 
32 See id. at 360. 
33 See id. at 319-21 (indictment by Luther Martin, Attorney General). 
34 Id. at 360. 
35 Id. at 333-34, 360. 
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prejudice a third person . . . .”36  One wonders whether under contemporary notions of criminal 
due process the prosecution of “conspirators,” absent predetermined and specified criminal 
conduct, would pass constitutional muster.  
     Retroactive changes in the elements of the common law of crimes may also be challenged 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.37  For a twenty-first century example 
consider Rogers v. Tennessee.38  The state of Tennessee had always adhered to the common law 
rule that a murder conviction would only be upheld if the victim died within “a year and a day” 
of the defendant’s action.39  But in Rogers the Tennessee Supreme Court retroactively abolished 
that rule and sustained the defendant’s conviction for murder despite the fact that the victim lived 
for fifteen months after the defendant struck the ultimately fatal blow.40  On certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the defendant argued that his conviction was a violation of the Constitution’s Ex 
Post Facto Clause.41  
     In a split five to four opinion a majority of the Rehnquist Court upheld the conviction.42  But 
Justice Scalia, on behalf of the dissent, forcefully applied his originalist understanding of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause and concluded that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s retroactive application of 
its decision to remove the year-and-a-day rule from its jurisprudence rendered Rogers’ 
conviction for murder invalid.43  It remains to be seen whether Scalia might muster a majority 
for this view under the recently reconstituted Roberts’ Court. 
                                                 
36 Id. at 366 (Chase, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).  Judge Buchanan delivered the opinion 
of the court. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states, among other things, from passing ex post facto laws). 
38 532 U.S. 451 (2001). 
39 See id. at 455. 
40 See id. at 454-56. 
41 See id. at 456. 
42 See id. (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).   
43 See id. at 467-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Thomas, and Breyer (in part), JJ.). 
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     An earlier Maryland court had faced a similar ex post facto problem.  In Lewis v. State,44 the 
Maryland Court of Appeals changed the common law rule that an accessory could not be tried 
until the principal was sentenced because it was convinced that “‘the rule has become unsound in 
the circumstances of modern life,’” and because “[w]hatever may have been the reason for the 
rule governing the sequence of the accessory’s and principal’s trials, that reason has long since 
disappeared.”45  But the court decided to give the rule change only prospective application out of 
concern that a retrospective change would impinge on basic fairness to the defendant.46  
B. Statutes of England 
     Subsequent Maryland Constitutions followed the lead of Article 3 of the Constitution of 1776 
in adopting English statutes, but with somewhat different wording.  The incorporation clause 
now found in Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution of 1867 reads 
as follows: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to . . . the benefit of such of the 
English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and 
seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their 
local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced 
by the Courts of Law or Equity . . . .47   
 
     In 1809, out of a concern that applicability of English statutes was left to rest on so vague a 
standard, the Maryland General Assembly directed Chancellor William Kilty to prepare a report 
of all such English statutes that were covered by the language of the Declaration of Rights.48  
Kilty’s report, published in 1811, found “one hundred and ninety-one Statutes applicable and 
                                                 
44 404 A.2d 1073 (Md. 1979). 
45 Id. at 1078-79 (citations omitted). 
46 Id. at 1077. 
47 MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 5, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 2, at 1779, 1780.  The 1867 Constitution was the last one adopted in Maryland, and its current text, available at 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/43const/pdf/2006const.pdf, may also be accessed through the Archives of 
Maryland Online.  For a comparison with Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1776, see 
supra note 17. 
48 See Steiner, supra note 5, at 357-58. 
10 
 
proper to be incorporated.”49  Sixty years later in 1870, Julian Alexander published A Collection 
of the British Statutes in Force in Maryland, According to the Report Thereof Made to the 
General Assembly by the Late Chancellor Kilty.50  It consisted of 847 pages of the compiled 
statutes and supporting notes.51  Although never officially adopted, Alexander’s British Statutes 
has typically been treated as authoritative by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
     For example, in 1822 in Dashiell v. Attorney General,52 the court accepted as gospel the 
conclusion in Kilty’s report that the Statute of Charitable Uses53 was not in force in Maryland.  
The court noted that the report had been prepared  “under the sanction of the state, for the use of 
its officers, and is a safe guide in exploring an otherwise very dubious path.”54  Writing in 1899, 
Bernard Steiner found that “in only two cases . . . were additional Statutes decided to have been 
found applicable, and that, in no case, was one found applicable by Kilty taken out of the list by 
the Court of Appeals.”55 
     There are numerous examples of twentieth  and twenty-first century applications of 
Alexander’s British Statutes.  Listed therein and still in force in Maryland today is the twenty 
year limitation in adverse possession on an owner’s right to enter upon land—imposed by 
Parliament in 162356—and the original statute of frauds as passed by Parliament in 1676.57  A 
                                                 
49 Id. at 359 (referring to WILLIAM KILTY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES (Annapolis, Jehu Chandler 
1811)).   
50 JULIAN J. ALEXANDER, A COLLECTION OF THE BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND, ACCORDING TO THE 
REPORT THEREOF MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE LATE CHANCELLOR KILTY (Baltimore, Cushings & 
Bailey 1870).   
51 Id. 
52 5 H. & J. 392 (Md. 1822). 
53 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). 
54 Dashiell, 5 H. & J. at 403. 
55 Steiner, supra note 5, at 360-61 (citing Sibley v. Williams, 3 G. & J. 52, 63 (Md. 1830) and Shriver v. State, 9 G. 
& J. 1, 11 (Md. 1837)). 
56 See An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of Suits in Law, 21 Jac., c. 16 (1623), reprinted in 2 
JULIAN J. ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND: ACCORDING TO THE REPORT THEREOF MADE TO 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE LATE CHANCELLOR KILTY 599, 599-600 (Ward Baldwin Coe ed., 1912) 
[hereinafter 2 ALEXANDER’S BRITISH STATUTES].  See Clayton v. Jensen, 214 A.2d 154, 157-58 (Md. 1965) 
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Parliamentary enactment in 1381 that permitted dispossessed owners to peaceably retake 
possession of their property without a court’s assistance likewise remains in effect.58  
     And in one case the Maryland Court of Appeals may have created some contrarian 
“incorporation” jurisprudence.  In Moxley v. Acker,59 the court found that the cause of action for 
forcible detainer, which had been created by Parliament in 1429, had been  incorporated into 
Maryland law by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights.60   The foundational English statute 
provided that when land was wrongfully possessed and “forcibly” held that the justices of the 
peace should have the sheriff put the malefactors out.61 
     According to the court’s view “[t]he issue in this case [was] whether force is required, or 
should be required, in the cause of action of forcible detainer.”62  The court found that while it 
was clear that forcible detention had been required under the  English law, the court had the 
power to change the rule if found to be “unsound in the circumstances of modern life . . . .”63  
Accordingly, it abolished the element of force and held “that the action of forcible detainer 
requires only that one unlawfully detain the property from the lawful possessor.”64  Hence in one 
                                                                                                                                                             
(upholding supra statute in an easement by prescription); Wilson v. Waters, 64 A.2d 135, 137 (Md. 1949) (affirming 
supra statute in adverse possession). 
57 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, reprinted in 2 ALEXANDER’S BRITISH 
STATUTES, supra note 56, at 689, 689-94.  See Adams v. Wilson, 284 A.2d 434, 438 (Md. 1971) (applying supra 
Statute of Frauds); Kline v. Lightman, 221 A.2d 675, 681-82 (Md. 1966) (affirming supra Statute of Frauds in its 
original form with a few “minor statutory modifications”). 
58 The Penalty Where Any Doth Enter into Lands Where It Is Not Lawful, or with Force, 1381, 5 Rich. 2, c. 8, 
reprinted in 1 JULIAN J. ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND: ACCORDING TO THE REPORT 
THEREOF MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE LATE CHANCELLOR KILTY 247, 247 (Ward Baldwin Coe ed., 
1912) [hereinafter 1 ALEXANDER’S BRITISH STATUTES].  See Laney v. State, 842 A.2d 773, 785 (Md. 2004) 
(upholding supra statute in a lawful landowner’s right to peacefully recover possession of property without court 
assistance). 
59 447 A.2d 857 (Md. 1982).  
60 See id. at 858.   
61 See The Duty of Justices of Peace Where Land is Entred upon or Detained with Force, 1429, 8 Hen. 6, c. 9, 
reprinted in 1 ALEXANDER’S BRITISH STATUTES, supra note 58, at 299, 300.  
62 Moxley, 447 A.2d at 859. 
63 Id. at 859-60 (citation omitted). 
64 Id. at 860.  Laney v. State further clarifies Moxley’s judicial modification:   
Another remedy available to a mortgagee seeking to gain possession of property from a 
holdover mortgagor is through a cause of action of forcible detainer. . . .  This cause of 
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case at least the Maryland Court of Appeals has treated an incorporated English statute as if it 
was “common law” and therefore subject to judicial modification without legislative amendment.  
     In 1974 the Maryland General Assembly undertook to clear up any lingering confusion as to 
which pre-1776 English statutes remained part of Maryland law.  As part of the re-codification of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland, and as a negative counterpoint to Alexander’s British Statutes, 
Section 14-115 of the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code lists the eighty British statutes 
that were in force and effect on July 4, 1776 that are no longer in force and effect.65  
C. Property Derived Under Charter Granted to Lord Baltimore 
     The statute Quia Emptores Terrarum66 was among the laws in force and effect in England 
when in 1632 Charles I granted the Maryland Charter to Cecil Calvert the Lord Baltimore.67  
Quia Emptores permitted “every Freeman to sell at his own pleasure his Lands and Tenements” 
outright in fee simple but prohibited the grantors from establishing themselves as feudal 
overlords by retention of perquisites such as fines for alienation or rents.68  But the eighteenth  
paragraph of the Maryland Charter granted Calvert and his heirs the power to grant Maryland 
lands “to Persons willing to take or purchase the same . . . by . . . Customs and Rents of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
action, applicable to mortgagees seeking to oust holdover mortgagors, has been modified by 
§ 8–402(b) of the Real Property Article . . . .  In Moxley, this Court further modified the 
“forcible detainer” action by deleting the requirement of force so that one can bring the cause 
of action to regain possession of property wrongfully detained in any way.  
842 A.2d 773, 785 n.15 (Md. 2004) (citations omitted). 
65 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-115 (LexisNexis 2003).  
66 Quia Emptores Terrarum (“Quia Emptores”), 18 Edw., c. 1 (1290), reprinted in 1 APPENDIX—NO. 1, REFERRED 
TO IN THE ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ROSE BENEFICENT ASSOCIATION: STATUTES OF THE REALM 9, 9 (n.d.). 
67 See Maryland Charter of 1632, para. XVIII, translated in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 
1677, 1684-85.  See also W. Calvin Chesnut, The Effect of Quia Emptores on Pennsylvania and Maryland Ground 
Rents, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 137, 139-40 (1942). 
68 See supra note 66.  See also Chesnut, supra note 67, at 137-39.  Chesnut explains that “[t]he effect of this was, of 
course, to bring the purchaser of land into direct relationship of responsibility to the chief overlord and thus to 
preserve to him unimpaired the benefit of the feudal incidents which had resulted from his original grant of the 
land.”  Id. at 139.  
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Kind, as . . . shall seem fit and agreeable . . . . ”69  The following non obstante clause in the 
Charter explained the contradiction: when granting property in fee simple the Lords Baltimore 
were expressedly authorized to charge rents “‘[s]tatute Quia Emptores Terrarum’ . . . to the 
contrary thereof notwithstanding.”70  The Calvert family was empowered to create their own 
feudal fiefdom in the wilderness. 
     The Lords Baltimore had looked to take their profit from the soil.  They offered patents to 
Maryland’s vacant lands in return for the purchase price, called “caution money,” payable at first 
in tobacco and then later in pounds sterling.71  When granting patents, however, Cecil and his 
successors only passed title by way of “subinfeudation.”72  After the grants, the “takers-up” 
continued to owe the Calvert family an annual quit-rent payable in perpetuity.73  The annual quit-
rents typically were set at four shillings per hundred acres.74  The quit-rents provided a perpetual 
source of income that would be passed on from the current generation to the eldest male heir in 
perpetuity.75  
     Cecil Calvert also started the policy of reserving large parcels of land to be erected into 
proprietary manors.76  These lands were held by the Baltimore barony in anticipation of 
increased values and, in the meantime, leased for cultivation in smaller holdings to long-term 
tenants.77  These proprietary lands would perpetuate the family’s aristocracy.78 
                                                 
69 Maryland Charter of 1632, para. XVIII, translated in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 
1677, 1684. 
70 Id., translated in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1677, 1685. 
71 GOULD, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
72 See KILTY, supra note 3, at 27-28.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (8th ed. 2004) (“The system under 
which the tenants in a feudal system granted smaller estates to their tenants, who in turn did the same from their 
pieces of land.”).   
73 See GOULD, supra note 3, at 9.  See also KILTY, supra note 3, at 32. 
74 GOULD, supra note 3, at 9. 
75 See sources cited supra note 73. 
76 GOULD, supra note 3, at 91. 
77 See id. at 91-92. 
78 See Charles M. Andrews, Introduction to BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., THE QUIT-RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 11, 18 (1919).  See also GOULD, supra note 3, at 89-101. 
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     By the beginning of the American Revolution the quit-rents reserved by the Lords Baltimore 
totaled over £8,000 per year.79  It is hard to determine just how economically burdensome the 
quit-rents were on the landowners of Maryland.  The amount of the quit-rent (four shillings per 
hundred acres) was assessed according to the acreage of the land, not according to the value of 
the land.80  When compared with market value, rents were cheap for expensive land but 
expensive for cheap land.  It seems likely, however, that Maryland’s eighteenth century 
aristocrats who had amassed their fortunes in land (e.g. Carrolls, Lloyds,  Howards, Dulanys, 
Bennetts, Keys, and Dorseys)81 were paying Lord Baltimore a significant annual tribute.82  One 
rough extrapolation put the average rate of exaction at approximately 1% of the land’s value.83  
     And independence only improved the economic circumstances of these Revolutionary 
aristocrats.  Article 3 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in the 1776 Maryland Constitution 
confirmed their entitlement “to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, granted . 
. . to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.”84  But in 1780 the Maryland General Assembly 
declared it “highly improper for, and derogatory to, the citizens of this [s]overeign and 
independent [s]tate, to pay quit-rent . . . to the [s]ubject of a foreign prince . . . .”85  The citizens 
of Maryland “from the declaration of independence, and for ever thereafter . . . [were] 
                                                 
79 Beverly W. Bond, Jr., The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies, 17 AM. HIST. REV. 496, 511 (1912). 
80 See id. at 501.  See also GOULD, supra note 3, at 54. 
81 See GOULD, supra note 3, at 76, 82-85.  
82 See Beverly W. Bond, Jr., The Quit Rent in Maryland, 5 MD. HIST. MAG. 350, 358 (1910) (providing a table of 
rent values and maintaining that the burden to the individual landholder was not “greatly oppressive”). 
83 See GOULD, supra note 3, at 54.  
84 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. III, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 2, at 1686, 1687. 
85 An Act to Abolish For Ever the Payment of Quit-Rent, ch. XVIII, pmbl. (1780), reprinted in 203 ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND: HANSON’S LAWS OF MARYLAND 238, 238 (photo. reprint 2000) (1787) [hereinafter HANSON’S LAWS OF 
MARYLAND].  The text of this book, available at 
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000203/html/index.html, may also be accessed 
through the Archives of Maryland Online. 
15 
 
exonerated and di[s]charged from the payment of the afore[s]aid quit-rent . . . .”86  Likewise, the 
reserved Baltimore manors were taken away; an act was passed to “[s]eize, confi[s]cate and 
appropriate” all property owned by British subjects within the state.87 
     The Revolution had relieved Maryland land owners from the burdensome and perpetual quit 
rents they had owed the Barons of Baltimore.  Moreover, the Baltimore proprietary manors and 
the property of loyalist supporters of the Crown had been confiscated and made the public 
property of the state of Maryland.  In 1781 Henry Harford, the last Lord Baltimore, estimated his 
loss at £447,000.88  Maryland’s independence served to both retain and shed selective aspects of 
its English legacy: English property was confiscated and its feudal privileges abolished, while 
the statutory and common law precedents of England were incorporated into Maryland law.   
                                                 
86 An Act to Abolish For Ever the Payment of Quit-Rent, ch. XVIII, para. II (1780), reprinted in HANSON’S LAWS 
OF MARYLAND, supra note 85, at 238, 238-39. 
87 An Act to Procure a Loan, and for the Sale of Escheat Lands, and the Confiscated British Property therein 
Mentioned, ch. LI, para. IV (1780), reprinted in id. at 274, 275.  
88 See 2 SCHARF, supra note 1, at 394. 
